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THE PROBLEMS OF JUDGING YOUNG
TECHNOLOGIES: A COMMENT ON
SONY, TORT DOCTRINES, AND THE
PUZZLE OF PEER-TO-PEER
R. Anthony Reeset
INTRODUCTION
Professor Yen's article Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of
Peer-to-Peer' tackles important questions about the scope of secon-
dary liability for copyright infringement by looking to principles of
liability in tort law. This approach yields useful suggestions for how
courts should decide whether to impose secondary liability in many of
the novel situations in which copyright owners have recently been
seeking to hold defendants' liable for infringement by third parties.
The article focuses in particular on the difficult problem of
whether the supplier of software that enables peer-to-peer (p2p) dis-
semination of works of authorship should be liable for copyright in-
fringement committed by users of that software, and the difficulties
that courts have had in applying the traditional secondary liability
doctrines to that question. Professor Yen suggests that for p2p tech-
nology, those doctrines should be replaced by a standard, derived
from tort principles of negligence and products liability, that would
evaluate whether the technology was reasonably designed to prevent
or limit infringement, essentially by weighing the costs and benefits
t Thomas W. Gregory Professor, School of Law, The University of Texas at Austin; Vis-
iting Professor, Stanford Law School, 2004-2005. B.A., Yale University; J.D., Stanford Law
School. Thanks to Stacey Dogan, Paul Goldstein, Mark Lemley, Christopher Leslie, Jessica
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of the technology. This standard, however, will likely result in many
instances in imposing liability on suppliers of technologies that pro-
duce a net social benefit, because it will generally require courts (and
technology developers) to evaluate the reasonableness of a technol-
ogy's design, and its costs and benefits, at a relatively early stage in
the evolution of the technology, when important information (particu-
larly about the technology's potential beneficial uses) is likely to be
poor.
Society would be better served in cases of technologies with both
infringing and noninfringing uses (including in the p2p cases) by
judging secondary liability not by the traditional doctrinal tests or by
the proposed reasonable design standard, but instead by the rule the
Supreme Court announced in Sony v. Universal Studios2 to determine
whether the maker of the videocassette recorder (VCR) was liable
when its customers used their VCRs to infringe. In that case, the
Court ruled that if the technology is capable of substantial noninfring-
ing use, then the technology supplier is not liable for copyright in-
fringements committed by the technology's users. This approach is
less likely in general to stifle technologies that produce a net social
benefit, and avenues other than secondary liability exist, and may be
preferable, to deal with any particular technology that passes the Sony
test but produces a net social cost.
I. TORT PRINCIPLES AND ORDINARY SECONDARY LIABILITY
Professor Yen's article does an excellent job of identifying how
secondary liability doctrines in copyright law-doctrines of contribu-
tory infringement and vicarious liability-have become unmoored
from their origins. At its core, contributory infringement seeks to
impose liability on those who actively, knowingly assist a direct in-
fringer-in essence to impose liability on the infringer's accomplices
for aiding and abetting the infringement. Vicarious liability for copy-
right infringement originated in the venerable doctrine of respondeat
superior, which requires principals (usually employers) to answer for
infringements committed by their agents (usually employees). Courts
seeking to apply these doctrines to boundary cases formulated tests
that tried to capture the underlying principles at the heart of each doc-
trine in a way that made clear that those principles covered the
boundary case at hand. As those tests became widely adopted, courts
sometimes became overly formalistic in using them, applying the
various verbal formulations without necessarily justifying those ap-
2 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
[Vol. 55:4
PROBLEMS OF JUDGING YOUNG TECHNOLOGIES
plications in terms of the underlying principles that the tests were
meant to capture.
Professor Yen presents this picture particularly clearly with respect
to vicarious liability. Early copyright cases imposed liability some-
what beyond the traditional employment context, holding operators of
dance halls liable for infringing public performances of musical
works by bands that the operators had hired to play in the dance hall,
even though the formal relationship between the operator and the
musicians was that of independent contractors rather than employer-
employee. Years after the dance-hall cases began to impose liability,
the Second Circuit in the landmark case Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
H.L. Green Co.3 faced the question of a department store's liability
for infringing record sales by the independent concessionaire that
operated the store's record department. Extrapolating from the gen-
eral principles that justified holding employers and dance-hall opera-
tors liable, and going beyond the "technical employer-employee rela-
tionship,",4 the court ruled that vicarious liability could be imposed if
"the right and ability to supervise [the infringing activity] coalesce
with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of
copyrighted materials."'5 On the facts of the case, the Second Circuit
found that the store was liable; although the infringing concessionaire
was not an employee, in the court's view the facts established that the
relationship between the store and the infringer was analogous
enough to warrant imposing liability on the same principles as in an
employer-employee situation.6
Professor Yen demonstrates that the Second Circuit's test, which
largely restated the respondeat superior principles underlying vicari-
ous liability, has, for many courts, taken on a life of its own that no
longer looks to those principles. The Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction7
case that he discusses, ruling that a flea market operator could be held
vicariously liable for infringing sales of recordings by vendors who
rented space at the flea market, is perhaps the high-water mark of this
approach. The Ninth Circuit's decision focuses almost wholly on the
3 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
4 Id. at 307.
5 Id.
6 The court recounted those facts in some detail. Employees of the licensee, Jalen, were
obliged to follow all of defendant Green's rules and regulations, and Green had the unreview-
able discretion to discharge them for breaches. When Jalen sold records in Green stores, the
customer got a receipt with Green's name on it and the sale proceeds went directly into Green's
cash registers, from which they were collected by Green's store cashier. Periodically, Green
would deduct its 10 to 12% share, deduct the salaries and withholding taxes for Jalen's employ-
ees (it paid the salaries directly to the employees and turned the withholding over to Jalen), and
then pay the remainder to Jalen. Id. at 306.
7 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
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test's language of right and ability to supervise (or "control," as pre-
vious courts had phrased the first prong), and on the financial inter-
est,8 and offered little discussion of whether the relationship between
the flea market operator and the vendor justified imposing liability in
the way that a relationship between an employer and employee or
independent contractor or concessionaire justified such liability.
Whatever the correct outcome of the secondary liability claims on the
facts of the case, Professor Yen is surely right that the development of
the law would be better served by express consideration of whether
the principles justifying vicarious liability as a general matter in fact
justify imposing liability in this case than by a relatively wooden ap-
plication of the "supervise" and "financial interest" language of the
standard doctrinal test. And that will continue to be true as courts are
presented with increasingly novel claims for secondary liability, such
as those that Professor Yen identifies in his concluding paragraph,
including one against credit card companies that allow online dis-
seminators of allegedly infringing material to charge their customers'
credit cards for their services. 9
Professor Yen's article is thus very helpful in suggesting that con-
sidering ordinary tort principles can help courts decide novel claims
in secondary liability cases. Courts faced with questions in contribu-
tory infringement cases of whether a defendant "knew" of a direct
infringer's activity can certainly benefit by looking to what Professor
Yen identifies as tort law's view that a substantial general certainty
that some injury will occur is not sufficient knowledge for imposing
secondary liability and that instead a substantial certainty of a rela-
tively immediate and specific injury to an identifiable party is re-
quired. 10 Similarly, viewing the control and direct financial interest
prongs of the vicarious liability test as indicators of whether the
agency relationship between the parties is the kind that justifies hold-
ing one liable for the acts of the other may help determine the appro-
priate scope of vicarious liability in copyright law.
Courts may well be receptive to Professor Yen's proposal in ordi-
nary secondary liability cases. One can read the recent Ninth Circuit
decision in Ellison v. Robertson" as perhaps limiting the potential
breadth of Fonovisa, at least as to vicarious liability. Fonovisa ruled
8 For criticism of Fonovisa's treatment of the directness of the financial benefit at issue,
see Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1367-68 (2004).
9 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1914 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
10 Yen, supra note 1, at 847-48.
1 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
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that the flea market operator would have a "direct financial interest"
in the infringing record sales by some of its vendors, even though the
operator received only a flat daily rental fee from the vendors, if the
chance to buy infringing records drew customers to the flea market,
and those customers then bought parking, admission tickets, and re-
freshments from the operator. Ellison, a decision involving AOL's
liability for the unauthorized dissemination of fiction on one of the
many hundreds of Usenet newsgroups that AOL retransmitted to its
members, emphasizes that a plaintiff must show the directness of the
financial benefit to the defendant in order to succeed on a vicarious
liability claim. The Ninth Circuit indicated that a copyright owner
must establish "a causal relationship between the infringing activity
and any financial benefit a defendant reaps.'1 2 Ellison reminds us
that Fonovisa ruled on a 12(b)(6) motion and so merely established
that infringing activity that "draws" customers could provide the di-
rect financial interest needed for secondary liability, while Ellison
makes clear that a copyright owner will have to prove the direct con-
nection between the infringing activity and the defendant's financial
benefit. But Ellison may also suggest a current judicial skepticism
about whether secondary liability might be extended too far, and thus
a willingness to look to tort principles, as Professor Yen suggests, in
deciding novel cases.
II. TORT PRINCIPLES AND SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR DUAL-USE
TECHNOLOGIES
The focus of Professor Yen's article, though, is not on ordinary
secondary liability cases, but rather on cases involving peer-to-peer
file sharing software and networks, the most prominent current exam-
ple of a "dual use" technology-that is, a technology that can be used
for both infringing and noninfringing purposes. Professor Yen ably
shows how much trouble lower courts have had in deciding-and
explaining-whether to hold suppliers of p2p technology liable for
infringements by p2p users. I agree with Professor Yen that the diffi-
culty in these cases is that the existing ordinary doctrines of secon-
dary liability that courts have applied fit the p2p problem very poorly.
Professor Yen therefore proposes replacing those doctrines with a
standard drawn from the tort law of negligence and products liability
that essentially evaluates whether the technology was reasonably de-
signed to limit or prevent infringement.
12 Id. at 1079.
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While I agree that dual-use technology cases should not be gov-
erned by the ordinary doctrines but instead by a special rule of secon-
dary liability, I prefer the rule announced in Sony-no liability for
supplying a copying technology if the technology is capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing use. 13 Sony is preferable because the courts that
engage in the analysis required by Professor Yen's reasonable design
proposal will likely have to evaluate a technology while it is still rela-
tively new and therefore will likely systematically undervalue the
potential long-term benefits of the technology. As a result, the stan-
dard will lead courts to impose liability and forestall the development
and deployment of technologies that might otherwise have substantial
benefits to society in general and often to copyright owners in particu-
lar. In this Part, I first suggest how Sony replaced the standard secon-
dary liability tests with a different test in dual-use technology cases
and why the p2p cases do not require changing Sony's test. I then
examine why Professor Yen's proposed alternative is likely to lead
courts to impose liability too often on suppliers of dual-use technolo-
gies: because it will require courts (and technology developers acting
in anticipation of what courts will decide) to evaluate technologies
when they are relatively new, and a technology's relative novelty will
complicate the cost-benefit analysis that the reasonable design stan-
dard requires. Finally, I explain why the Sony test is a better alterna-
tive for evaluating liability of suppliers of dual-use technologies.
A. Peer-to-Peer Technology, and Judicial Reactions to It, Do Not
Require Abandoning Sony
Professor Yen's discussion of the Napster14, Aimster 15, and Grok-
sterj6 decisions clearly shows the difficulties of applying the tradi-
tional doctrinal tests for contributory infringement and vicarious li-
ability to claims involving dual-use technology, and I will not reprise
that discussion here.17 Professor Yen argues that the problem in the
p2p cases is that courts have applied copyright's usual secondary li-
13 By "copying" technology, I mean any technology that enables activity that falls within
the general scope of a copyright owner's exclusive rights, even if the activity does not involve
reproduction, but rather, for example, performance or display of a work. This is consistent with
the view that the requirement in an infringement suit that the copyright owner prove "copying"
requires proving that the defendant engaged in some activity reserved to the copyright owner,
even if the defendant did not produce tangible copies of the work.
14 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
15 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
16 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480).
17 Yen, supra note 1, at 832-44 For another critique of this line of cases, see Lemley &
Reese, supra note 8, at 1355-65.
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ability doctrines without sufficient attention to the tort principles that
originally animated, and should guide development of, those doc-
trines. In my view, the difficulty in applying the traditional secondary
liability doctrines to the p2p cases has a different source. The dual-
use technology cases simply present a very different kind of secon-
dary liability claim than the existing doctrines were meant to address.
Supplying to the general public a technology that can subsequently be
used in both legitimate and illegitimate ways does not really fit either
the accomplice model at the heart of contributory infringement or the
principal-agent model at the heart of vicarious liability. As a result,
courts trying to apply these doctrines in the p2p context have pro-
duced, as Professor Yen nicely demonstrates, a very messy set of
opinions, essentially because they are using tools that were designed
for a different job.
Because the dual-use technology cases present fundamentally dif-
ferent issues than those addressed by contributory infringement and
vicarious liability doctrines, those cases demand a different approach
than the traditional doctrines, and Professor Yen proposes an alterna-
tive: addressing the p2p secondary liability issue by reformulating
the applicable doctrines along lines suggested by tort principles of
negligence and products liability. The next section discusses this
proposal in detail. But we should recognize that we already have a
different approach for secondary liability in dual-use technology
cases: the one set out by the Supreme Court in Sony v. Universal City
Studios. The Sony majority holds that if a technology is capable of
substantial noninfringing use (or, perhaps, of commercially signifi-
cant noninfringing use), then copyright law will not hold the supplier
of that technology liable for infringements committed using the tech-
nology.
18
Professor Yen reads Sony similarly to the way the Ninth Circuit
read it in the Napster case. That reading finds Sony relevant only to
contributory infringement, and not to vicarious liability,19 and sees
Sony merely as a limit on the circumstances in which a court can im-
pute knowledge to a supplier of a dual-use technology to determine
contributory infringement. 20 In this view, Sony addresses the dual-use
technology problem merely by refining one of the tests of traditional
secondary liability doctrine.
18 464 U.S. 417.
19 239 F.3d at 1022; Yen, supra note 1, at 831. On the applicability of Sony to vicarious
liability claims, see Lemley & Reese, supra note 8, at 1356 n.41.
20 239 F.3d at 1020; see also Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160-61; Yen, supra note 1, at 828,
833, 845.
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I read Sony more broadly as not refining the traditional tests but
displacing them. With respect to both contributory infringement and
vicarious liability, Sony teaches that if the plaintiff claims that the
supplier of a dual-use technology is liable for infringements commit-
ted by users of the technology, then the traditional tests simply do not
apply to that claim, and instead a court should look to whether the
technology is capable of substantial noninfringing uses. If it is, then
no liability should be imposed; if it is not, then liability is appropriate.
Professor Yen dislikes this reading of Sony because, he writes, it
produces extreme and risky outcomes. 2' As a practical matter, I do
not think that the case has been made that the Sony approach is ex-
treme and should be abandoned. The Sony rule seems to have led to
relatively good results overall in the last 20 years in terms of allowing
technology development to flourish. 2 And on the whole, copyright
owners have generally proven relatively adroit at finding ways to
exploit and profit from new technologies that interact with works of
authorship, as demonstrated quite spectacularly in the case of the
VCR itself: the U.S. film industry today eams more revenue from
home video distribution of its audiovisual works than from theatrical
releases.2 3 It therefore seems far from clear that with respect to dual-
use technologies generally the case has been made for abandoning the
Sony approach. It is not clear for which particular technologies Sony
would free a supplier from liability for infringing uses of the technol-
ogy while Professor Yen's proposed approach would hold the sup-
21 Yen, supra note 1, at 852.
22 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae The Business Software Alliance 10-11, available at:
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM v_Grokster/050124_BSAGrosterBrief.pdf (describing Sony
as having provided "a clear and predictable test for innovators and the courts" and noting that
"[tiechnology companies have relied upon this bright-line test and invested billions of dollars in
research and development over the past two decades, resulting in unprecedented technological
progress that has directly benefited users worldwide."); but see Jessica Litman, The Sony Para-
dox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917 (2005) (expressing skepticism that Sony's substantial nonin-
fringing use test has offered innovators much effective protection against infringement suits by
copyright owners).
23 See WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE
OF ENTERTAINMENT 75-76 (2004) (indicating that in 1990 major film studios earned $3.3 billion
from theatrical releases and $5.1 billion from sales and rentals of home videos); id. at 212 (indi-
cating that studios earned $7.8 billion in 2000 from sales and rentals of videotapes and DVDs);
Kate Bulkley, DVDs force the movie business to rewrite its rules, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 20,
2004, at 8 ("In the US, 2002 revenue from DVD/VHS video sales and rental accounted for 62
per cent of the total domestic income of the major studios, according to consultancy Screen
Digest."). See also FREDERICK WASSER, VENt, VIDI, VIDEO: THE HOLLYWOOD EMPIRE AND
THE VCR 153 & Table 5.3 (2001) (showing that for U.S. theatrical films, worldwide home
video revenues exceeded worldwide box office revenues beginning in 1987); HAROLD L.
VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 55 (4th
ed. 1998) (showing 1995 worldwide theatrical earnings of $4.9 billion and home video earnings
of $7.3 billion, and forecasting that in 2000 about 40% of film industry worldwide revenues
would derive from home video formats and about 30% from theatrical exhibition).
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plier liable or that imposing liability (and possibly an injunction
against the supply of the technology) on such a technology would be
socially desirable.
Perhaps the outcomes of the Sony test and Professor Yen's reason-
able design test would be different as to p2p software and networks
(although the social desirability of imposing secondary liability on the
suppliers of such software is less clear). Certainly the current primary
argument against Sony seems to be that p2p technology has resulted
in widespread but dispersed acts of direct copyright infringement, and
that reading Sony to exempt suppliers of p2p technology from liability
for that infringement will require copyright owners to tolerate in-
fringement on such a scale that it will eliminate or substantially un-
dermine the incentives to create and disseminate works of authorship
in the first place. Peer-to-peer technology has indisputably led to
widespread unauthorized dissemination of copyrighted material, par-
ticularly musical recordings, though the extent to which that dissemi-
nation has cut into the financial returns on recorded music is a subject
24
of much disagreement. But the problem of widespread infringement
on p2p networks does not necessarily require revising Sony's liability
exemption for dual-use-technology suppliers generally. Several al-
ternative approaches have been proposed for dealing specifically with
p2p infringement, including levies on devices and services used in
p2p operations that would be used to compensate copyright owners;
25
voluntary blanket licensing of music for private noncommercial p2p
use;26 and an administrative dispute resolution system to allow copy-
right owners to assert infringement claims against directly infringing
24 See, e.g. Kai-Lung Hui & Ivan Prig, Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded
Music, 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS No. I Art. 11 (2003); Stan J. Liebowitz,
Pitfalls in Measuring the Impact of File-sharing, available at
http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/pitfalls.pdf (last visited March 29, 2005); Stan J.
Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the Record Industry? The Evidence So Far (2003).
available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/Delivery.cfn/SSRNID414162_code030627500.pdf?abstractid=414
162 (last visited March 29, 2005); Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (2004), available at
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharingMarch2004.pdf; Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel,
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper No. 10874, Piracy on the High
C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College
Students (2004), at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W10874 (last visited March 29, 2005).
25 See FISHER, supra note 23. Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 1 (2004); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow
Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2003); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE 300-04 (2004); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 312-15 (2002).
26 See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., A BETTER WAY FORWARD: VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE
LICENSING OF MUSIC FILE SHARING (Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.eff.org/share/collective licwp.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
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p2p users more cheaply and quickly than through copyright litigation
in federal court.27
As Professor Yen shows, the traditional doctrinal tests for secon-
dary liability are a poor fit for judging secondary liability of those
who supply dual-use technologies. But Sony, read as providing an
alternative to those tests rather than refining them, deals more appro-
priately with dual-use technologies. And to the extent that Sony cre-
ates difficulties for copyright owners dealing with p2p networks,
those difficulties are better dealt with by using solutions targeted at
the p2p problem than by abandoning Sony's general rule for technol-
ogy suppliers.
B. Problems With the Proposed Alternative
Abandoning Sony would, of course, require choosing what would
replace it. Professor Yen examines the tort principles underlying or
analogous to copyright's secondary liability doctrines and finds they
suggest a new approach. He suggests that for contributory infringe-
ment, tort law would lead to adopting a negligence approach, while
for vicarious liability the relevant analogy would be products liability
law. Under both views, the actual analysis of the secondary liability
question for supplying a dual-use technology would largely converge
and essentially lead to liability unless the designer of the p2p technol-
ogy in question had acted reasonably in designing the technology to
reduce the risk of infringement, particularly in light of alternative
ways in which she could have designed the technology. 28 Both pro-
posed approaches would require courts to balance the social costs of
the infringement enabled by a p2p technology against the social bene-
fits that the technology produces,29 and would admonish courts to
consider particularly carefully both the current and potential benefits,
in recognition of what Professor Yen calls the Sony decision's wis-
dom in drawing attention to a technology's capability for substantial
noninfringing uses.3°
My reservations about this proposal arise because I am less confi-
dent than Professor Yen that courts are in a position to do a good job
27 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 8, at 1410-1425.
28 See Yen, supra note 1, at 850 (indicating that most p2p contributory infringement cases
would be resolved not by intentional tort principles but by negligence principles, and summariz-
ing the negligence analysis as turning on "whether the defendants took reasonable precautions
against the risk of infringement"); id. at 855 (discussing p2p vicarious liability proposal based
on products liability as focusing on determining whether technology's design is reasonable in
light of possible alternative designs).
29 Id. at 850-51; id. at 855-56.
30 Id. at 829-830.
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at the kind of detailed, fine-grained weighing of costs and benefits
that it would require.31 In particular, I think that courts will generally
be called upon to weigh these costs and benefits at a time when the
technology is in its infancy, and that such early consideration will
present significant challenges to robust analysis of a dual-use tech-
nology's costs and benefits. In the abstract, the cost-benefit analysis
approach is appealing. Exempting the supplier of a dual-use technol-
ogy from liability under Sony makes little sense when we know that a
technology produces a social benefit of $100 and a social cost of
$1000.32 But when we are unlikely to be able to quantify a technol-
ogy's actual costs and benefits, or perhaps even their relative magni-
tudes, with any degree of certainty, Sony's prophylactic rule generally
shielding against liability seems far less ridiculous than the firm num-
bers in the hypothetical might suggest. Several structural problems
suggest that courts are not well-positioned to accurately assess the
social benefits of dual-use technologies, in large part because courts
(and technology developers anticipating court decisions) will have to
weigh a technology's costs and benefits when that technology is in its
infancy (when claims of secondary copyright liability are often
brought). The likely problems of evaluating new technologies call
into question the likely accuracy of the kind of detailed cost-benefit
analysis that Professor Yen's proposal requires. The following sec-
tions discuss in more detail several likely difficulties in evaluating
technologies when they are new.
1. Difficulties Facing Courts in Evaluating New Technologies
a. Undervaluing Potential Uses
Experience suggests that courts may be reluctant to give much
weight to potential future uses of a new technology if they do not see
any current exploitation of such uses.3 3 The p2p cases themselves
offer some evidence of this preference for evaluating current uses and
reluctance to value future uses. In Napster and Aimster, various po-
31 For these purposes, I take the relevant costs and benefits to be those related to copy-
right, not other costs such as, for example, the potential impact of toxic chemicals in a copying
device.
32 See Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
THE ANTITRUST BULL. 423,444 (2002).
-3 Of course, all anticipated social benefits (like costs) will presumably be discounted to
present value in a court's analysis simply because they are benefits that will be realized in the
future, if at all. My argument in the sections that follow is that we have reason to expect that
courts will discount future potential benefits of new technologies more than is justified by the
fact that they are in the future.
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tential noninfringing uses of the p2p systems at issue were identi-
fied.34 These were not mere theoretically possible uses; they were
uses to which the technology in its current state could immediately be
put. In Aimster, Judge Posner himself identified five potential catego-
ries of noninfringing use that the defendant's system, as it then ex-
isted, allowed. 35 Yet while the circuit courts in both cases acknowl-
edged these possible legitimate uses, the tenor of both opinions treats
these uses largely as makeweights by defendants desperately seeking
to justify a technology currently being used overwhelmingly for in-
fringing purposes.36  Indeed, Judge Posner in the Aimster decision
expressly indicates that in order to enjoy the benefit of Sony's protec-
tion from liability, the technology supplier would have to offer evi-
dence of current and actual, not merely potential, noninfringing use
of the technology.37
In the Grokster case, by contrast, the defendants put forth evidence
of actual current use of their p2p software-perhaps at least 10% of
its use-for noninfringing purposes.38  Presented with evidence of
actual noninfringing use, both the trial and the appellate courts in
Grokster seemed more concerned than the Napster and Aimster courts
about the danger that imposing liability would cut off legitimate use.
The contrast, especially in light of Aimster's express demand for a
weighing of actual uses in determining liability,39 suggests that courts
may be inclined to give insufficient weight to potential uses to which
a new technology can be put even when those uses are enabled by the
current version of the technology. This inclination would tend to
skew the cost-benefit analysis of the new technology toward a finding
of net social cost, and to incline courts to hold the developer liable for
users' infringements.
34 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019;Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652-53.
15 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652-53.
36 This attitude is even clearer in the district court decision in Napster. See A&M Re-
cords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
37 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
18 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035-36 (C.D.Cal. 2003)
(detailing numerous declarations offering evidence of use of p2p software for dissemination of
"public domain materials, government documents, media content for which distribution is
authorized, media content as to which the rights owners do not object to distribution, and com-
puter software for which distribution is permitted"); Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161 (describing in
detail several instances of noninfringing use of defendants' p2p software, including example of
band Wilco, which disseminated by p2p network an album that its recording company had
decided "had no commercial potential" in order to demonstrate widespread interest in the re-
cording and convince a company to release it); id. at 1162 n.10 (indicating that plaintiffs con-
ceded that 10% of use of defendant's software was for noninfringing purposes).
39 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649 ("some estimate of the respective magnitudes of [infringing
and noninfringing] uses is necessary" for judging secondary liability); id. at 652-53 (requiring
evidence of actual uses).
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b. Problems Identifying Future Beneficial Uses of New Technologies
The contrast just noted between the Napster and Aimster courts on
one hand, and the Grokster courts on the other, in considering exist-
ing potential noninfringing uses of a new technology further suggests
that courts may well give even less weight to potential noninfringing
uses that are not currently possible using the technology but that
might be enabled by further development of the technology or of
complementary inputs. In the p2p cases, the courts were presented
with presently possible noninfringing (or potentially noninfringing)
uses. But courts faced with evaluating the costs and benefits of a new
dual-use technology also need to identify the uses to which the tech-
nology might be put in the future in order to anticipate the potential
costs and benefits of such uses, and they are likely to have difficulty
doing so.
History suggests that often even those who are relatively inti-
mately involved with the creation and development of a new technol-
ogy do not foresee many of the primary uses eventually made of that
technology. 40 The early developers of radio transmission were pri-
marily attempting to produce a means of point-to-point individual
communication in situations where wired communication was infea-
sible (such as between ship and shore), not a medium for communi-
cating by broadcast from a single transmitter to an enormous audience
of multiple receivers.4 ' When Thomas Edison developed technology
for recording sound, he envisioned its use primarily for business pur-
poses such as dictation, as well as for recording the spoken voice (in
the form of deathbed testaments, readings and speeches by important
literary and political figures, and recorded books for the blind), rather
than for entertainment purposes or recording of music.42 One biogra-
pher wrote that Edison "failed to comprehend or foresee what was to
constitute the magnificent destiny of his invention" 43 and that he said,
"I don't want the phonograph sold for amusement purposes. It is not
a toy. I want it sold for business purposes only."44 While these ex-
40 See generally Nathan Rosenberg, Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technology, 10
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 3 (1972); Nathan Rosenberg, A Good Cystal Ball Is Hard To
Find, AM. HERITAGE OF INVENTION & TECH., Spring 1986, pp. 44-50.
41 See, e.g., Nathan Rosenberg, A Good Crystal Ball Is Hard To Find, AM. HERITAGE OF
INVENTION & TECH., Spring 1986, at 47; Nathan Rosenberg, Factors Affecting the Diffusion of
Technology, 10 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 3, 13-14 (1972).
42 See MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, EDISON 171-174 (1959); ANDRE MILLARD, EDISON AND
THE BUSINESS OF INNOVATION 78-87 (1990). Recorded music was one of the ten possible appli-
cations of the phonograph that Edison enumerated in 1878, but his initial efforts at commerciali-
zation were largely not in that direction. MILLARD, 78-87, 318-326.
43 MILLARD, supra note 42, at 172.
4 MILLARD, supra note 42, at 326.
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amples do not necessarily involve technologies that have early in-
fringing uses and later-discovered noninfringing uses, they do illus-
trate that even those who develop new technologies do not necessarily
accurately predict the ways in which those technologies will be used.
Given that those close to new technologies often do not anticipate
how they will develop, courts seem unlikely to have a good chance of
identifying with much accuracy how people will come to use a new
technology and the social benefits and costs those uses might create.
Sony itself is not particularly reassuring on this score. Almost none of
the justices or lower-court judges really considered possible future
uses of the VCR, focusing instead on the currently enabled uses of the
device. This focus may have made sense in Sony, which involved a
largely static piece of stand-alone equipment.45 But the difficulty of
identifying future uses of new technologies seems likely to pose a
bigger problem today and going forward, since digital technologies
are often more dynamic and may be susceptible to a greater eventual.
variety of uses than devices such as the VCR (or the technologies
embodied in those devices).
c. Overstating the Costs of Infringement
While courts may systematically undervalue the potential social
benefits of a new dual-use technology, they may also overvalue the
social costs of such technologies. One reason for this is that infring-
ing uses are likely to be occurring and currently observable when
copyright owners sue for infringement, in contrast to potential future
noninfringing uses of the technology. Another reason is that courts
may be likely to consider all infringing uses of a technology as social
costs. Given the extremely broad definition of copyright owners'
exclusive rights in current law, courts may find that many acts may
technically constitute infringement. 46 It is not clear, however, that
45 Largely, but not entirely. Most of the models sold at the time of the trial in Universal
City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1979) did not include a
remote control, which may in large degree explain the survey findings that most people who
watched recordings for time-shifting purposes did not skip the recorded commercials. Id. at 468
(noting that survey showed that only 25% of viewers fast-forwarded through commercials).
Today, of course, remote controls for televisions and video recorders are ubiquitous.
46 For example, Judge Posner offhandedly concluded in Aimster that Sony established that
fast-forwarding through the commercials in a recorded television broadcast would come within
the scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, Aimster, 334 F.3d at 647-48, a conclusion
that finds no express support in the majority opinion in Sony, which focuses on the home re-
corder's act of reproduction of a televised work, not on whether skipping commercials during
playback prepares a derivative work. Judge Posner's analysis would seem to apply equally to
fast forwarding through portions of a film on DVD or to playing the tracks on an audio CD in an
order other than that in which they appear on the disc and to condemn such activities as infring-
ing.
[Vol. 55:4
PROBLEMS OF JUDGING YOUNG TECHNOLOGIES
every technical act of infringement should be considered as a cost of a
new technology. In some cases, an act that infringes gives a user ac-
cess to a work where she simply never would have paid for that ac-
cess. In such instances, acts that technically infringe as a legal matter
have no detrimental economic impact on the copyright owner but in
fact benefit society by reducing the deadweight loss that copyright
protection itself imposes by creating a market price significantly
greater than the marginal CoSt. 47 The debates over the impact of the
use of p2p networks on the recording industry48 demonstrate the diffi-
culty in quantifying how much infringing use of any particular tech-
nology actually falls into this category, but some use surely does.
Nonetheless, courts evaluating dual-use technology cases seem likely
to take a relatively formal view that sees all infringing acts enabled by
the technology as a cost,4 9 and, consequently, may be likely to restrict
technologies more often than would be desirable.
d. Failing To Account for Interaction of Short-Term Infringement
Costs and Long-Term Benefits from Noninfringing Future Uses
Courts balancing social costs of a technology's infringing uses
against the benefits of its noninfringing uses may also give insuffi-
cient weight to important interactions between infringing and nonin-
fringing uses of new technologies. The example of the VCR suggests
that tolerating some amount of infringement in the short term may be
important in driving consumer adoption of a technology that, in the
long term and with widespread deployment, will be put to much
wider noninfringing uses that provide copyright owners with enor-
mous markets. In the VCR case, widespread adoption of the device
created a huge market for the rental and sale of prerecorded cassettes
of copyrighted audiovisual works, which in turn laid the groundwork
for the rise of the even larger DVD market. As a result, motion pic-
ture studios have for some years earned greater revenues from ex-
ploiting their works in the home video/DVD market than in theatrical
47 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 8, at 1374 n.1 10.
48 See supra, text accompanying note 24.
49 Of course, the lack of economic harm to the copyright owner from an activity that falls
within the scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights is relevant to determining whether
that activity constitutes fair use, and courts evaluating dual-use technologies may, as the Sony
courts did, consider the lack of economic harm in determining whether a category of use (such
as unauthorized home time shifting recording of television programming) is fair. But because
this fair use analysis considers whether an activity would reduce the value of a copyrighted
work if it became widespread, a court might well deem a particular category of use (such as, for
example, unauthorized home time-shifting) not to be a fair use, even though some portion of
those making the use would have been unwilling or unable to pay the price demanded by the
copyright owner. As a result, fair use analysis alone will not necessarily capture the social
benefit of uses that reduce copyright's deadweight loss.
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release.5° Of course, the market for prerecorded cassettes or discs
does not require that consumers have a device such as the VCR that
allows the recording of audiovisual content; only the playback func-
tion is needed. But it is far from clear that, when the VCR was devel-
oped and introduced to the public in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a
machine that only played prerecorded material would have found a
large number of buyers. The ability to record television programs
appears to have been a primary motivator for consumers to buy the
devices. In its early days, the VCR competed against playback-only
laserdisc systems, but the superior picture that those systems provided
"4was simply not superior enough to impress most people as sufficient
compensation for the inability to record., 51 But once millions of con-
sumers bought VCRs, seemingly in significant part for their recording
functions, the conditions existed for the explosion of the prerecorded
cassette market. Even if the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sony that un-
authorized home-time shifting was not fair use had been upheld by
the Supreme Court and all such use weighed as a social cost of the
VCR, in the long run copyright owners and society might well have
benefited from allowing such infringement and permitting the sale of
the VCR, because it helped to establish the conditions for an ex-
tremely lucrative new method of exploiting copyrighted works, the
benefits of which might well have exceeded the costs of early infring-
ing uses.
It is possible that in a few decades a similar story might be told
with respect to digital music technologies. Initial users of these tech-
nologies may well be engaged largely in infringing, or at least poten-
tially infringing, activity: downloading digital recordings using p2p
networks, burning copies of CDs, and ripping recordings from CDs to
music files stored on a computer or a portable music player.52 These
50 See supra, text accompanying note 23.
51 JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT CAUSED 13,
192 (rev. ed. 2002). See also WASSER, supra note 23, at 60-70 (discussing various early play-
back-only video systems). While playback-only systems might have achieved substantial mar-
ket penetration in the absence of competition from recording devices, it seems likely that con-
sumer adoption would have been slower for playback-only devices than it was for the more
versatile recording systems.
52 How much of this activity actually infringes is disputed, particularly outside the p2p
context. Copyright owners have asserted that most personal copying by burning a duplicate CD
or ripping CD tracks to transferable and usually compressed-format files is infringing. See, e.g.,
RIAA, Frequently Asked Questions-Downloading and Uploading, at
http://www.riaa.com/issues/music/downup-faq.asp#digitaldevices (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
At least one circuit court has held that the latter activity, while apparently not protected under
the Audio Home Recording Act's limitation on music copyright owners' exclusive rights, 17
U.S.C. § 1008 (1997), qualifies as fair use as noninfringing "space shifting," by analogy to the
time-shifting use of audiovisual works held fair in Sony. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
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potentially infringing uses, however, have created an enormous
awareness of the advantages and potential of digital music, and ar-
guably paved the way for the legitimate market in digital music that
has begun to develop in recent years. Indeed, many would say that
the existence of digital music technologies initially used in infringing
or potentially infringing ways pressured music copyright owners to
begin to create a legitimate digital music market that they otherwise
might not have.53 Whatever the actual costs of infringement today
using digital music technologies, they may ultimately pale in com-
parison to the money to be made by copyright owners exploiting their
works using those technologies and their improved descendants.
The VCR experience thus offers a cautionary tale not only about
the difficulty of foreseeing the beneficial ways in which a dual-use
technology will come to be used in the future, but also about the pos-
sibility that tolerating the costs of a technology's initial infringing
uses in the short run may sometimes be necessary to reap the long-
term benefits of later noninfringing uses. And even where the in-
fringing uses are not necessary to create the market for the nonin-
fringing uses, the costs of the infringement may be more than com-
pensated because they accelerate that market's development. The
market for prerecorded copies of movies and television programs
might well have developed by the sale of playback-only devices, but
it surely would have developed far more slowly than it did with the
advent of the VCR.
e. Finding Infringement-Limiting Designs That Severely Constrain a
New Technology to be Reasonable
My final concern about courts applying the proposed reasonable
design tests also arises from the problems of evaluating a technology
when it is very new, but does not relate to identifying how the tech-
nology will be used, determining whether any of those uses will in-
fringe copyright and to what extent, or evaluating the costs and bene-
fits of infringing and noninfringing uses. Instead, the concern here
relates to the evaluation of whether a technology developer acted
"reasonably" in designing the technology to limit infringement, and
the way in which the very novelty of a challenged technology may
affect the reasonableness inquiry.
53 Indeed, it is possible that Sony's determination that supplying a VCR did not result in
copyright infringement liability might have pressured the film industry to market prerecorded
cassettes, or to do so more quickly and aggressively than they might otherwise have done, in
order to capitalize on a technology that could not be suppressed using copyright law. Cf
Rosenberg, Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technology, supra note 40, at 26 (suggesting that
appearance of innovative technologies spurs improvements in competing older technologies).
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Many potential infringement-limiting controls on an infant tech-
nology may seem reasonable because the full capacity of the technol-
ogy is not understood. As a result, courts may impose liability unless
designers implement such controls, and rational designers will pre-
sumably anticipate potential liability and build in such controls in
order to avoid liability. But these controls may well prevent, or cer-
tainly delay, the full flowering of the technology's capacities and the
social benefits it might offer.
Take the example of the World Wide Web. In the mid-1990s, the
technology of the Web was just beginning to emerge; few people had
access to it and relatively little content was available. But the poten-
tial for copyright infringement on Web sites was fairly evident.
Those who designed Web browsers and server software, and who
provided hosting and Internet connectivity, might have implemented
precautionary measures to limit infringement. For example, they
might have required that before any content posted to a publicly
available Web site became accessible to visitors to that site, the con-
tent would have to be "quarantined" and available for 48 or 72 hours
at a special Web site accessible only to copyright owners, who could
screen the content before it went online generally and object to con-
tent that they alleged to be infringing If Web technology providers
failed to do this, a copyright owner seeking to hold them liable for
infringement committed by their customers might have argued in
court that they had failed to take a reasonable precaution to limit in-
fringement and thus should be held liable.
Today, having seen how the Web developed, this suggested pre-
caution might seem fairly ludicrous. But in the early years of the
Web, when most people did not have access and were certainly not
used to the ability for content to be essentially instantaneously posted
on Web sites, the restriction might well have appeared to be a reason-
able way to limit copyright infringement. Courts might have found it
to be a reasonable step that Web technology providers should take, or
those providers might have thought that such a judicial outcome was
likely enough that they would have adopted the step themselves. But
while the precaution might have seemed reasonable at the time, it
would likely have significantly altered the nature of the World Wide
Web. Not having to wait 48 or 72 hours in order to post material to
the Web is obviously crucial to many substantial activities that now
take place on the Web--such as sites reporting or commenting on
current news, politics, or culture; blogs; and commercial sites adding
items to inventory, to name but a few.
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The example may seem somewhat far-fetched,54 but it illustrates
the point that when a technology is in its infancy, designers and courts
may have at best a dim understanding of how the technology will
evolve and come to be used, and that possible controls on infringe-
ment that may seem reasonable at that point in the development of the
technology may significantly diminish the social benefits that the
technology could provide if allowed to develop without the controls.
It might be that in some instances the controls deemed reasonable in a
technology's early years would in fact reduce the social costs of copy-
right infringement more significantly than they would reduce the so-
cial benefits that the technology would produce without the controls.
But it is not clear that, in the early stages of a technology's lifecycle,
courts or technology developers have the information necessary to
distinguish those instances from cases where precisely the opposite
result will occur. This, I think, counsels against adopting an approach
to secondary liability for dual-use technology suppliers that will often
require evaluating potential alternative, infringement-limiting designs
while the technology is young.
2. Difficulties Facing Developers in Designing New Technologies
Imposing secondary liability on suppliers of a dual-use technology
based on whether the technology was reasonably designed to limit
infringing uses will, in most cases, require evaluating the costs and
benefits of a technology when it is new. For the reasons just ex-
plored, courts seem likely to undervalue the benefits of a new tech-
nology and overstate its costs, and therefore impose liability on the
technology supplier in some cases where the net benefits would in
fact surpass the costs. In addition, the reasonable design standard
may lead those who develop new dual-use technologies to forego
developing technologies that would produce a net social benefit, for at
least two reasons.
The proposed test of liability for dual-use technology suppliers
turns on the reasonableness with which the supplier designed the
technology. Those who design dual-use technologies will obviously
do so with this liability standard in mind, and will thus have to deter-
mine as they develop their products whether a court is likely to find
their design decisions to be reasonable. But, as just discussed, courts
5 On the other hand, history offers examples of actual controls on early technologies thatin hindsight may seem equally far-fetched. Cartrivision, an early VCR technology, featured
prerecorded rental cassettes with a locking device that prevented a home viewer from rewinding
the cassette, so that the recorded film could only be watched once per rental. LARDNER, supra
note 51, at 68-71.
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seem likely to systematically err in weighing the reasonableness of
design decisions, and to do so in a way that increases the likelihood
that a technology developer will be found to have designed her prod-
uct unreasonably and therefore be subject to liability.
Technology developers will face many of the same difficulties as
courts in evaluating whether their technology designs are reason-
able-including the inability to identify potential future noninfringing
uses and the possibility of accepting as reasonable fairly severe in-
fringement-limiting constraints. But a rational technology developer
will also take into account the likelihood that a court asked to evalu-
ate the reasonableness of her design will make the kind of errors just
described and hold the designer liable. Thus, even if the designer is
able to make a more optimistic and accurate forecast than a court
about the potential future noninfringing uses of the technology and
their social benefits, courts skeptical about the benefits of future uses
(particularly in the face of currently observable infringement) may
mistakenly undervalue the social benefits, making a finding of liabil-
ity more likely. If courts are in fact likely to systematically judge the
net social benefit of new dual-use technologies too harshly, technol-
ogy developers' choices in designing their products will reflect that
likelihood. And in making those choices developers are likely to take
into account the possibility that they will face liability beyond simply
compensating copyright owners-liability for their profits or for
statutory damages-as well as a possible injunction against continued
dissemination of their technology.
For technology designers, another difficulty with liability based on
whether they acted reasonably in designing the technology to reduce
the risk of infringement is that it may be unclear, when the technology
is designed, precisely what conduct is infringing. A new technology
will often enable new kinds of uses for works of authorship, and
whether those uses are infringing will be an open question. The
VCR, for example, enabled for the first time home time-shifting of
publicly transmitted audiovisual works, a use that simply had not
been possible before. Should a VCR developer, in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, have designed the machine to prevent or reduce such
unauthorized time-shifting? This would depend, in part, on what rea-
sonable alternative designs were available to the developer.55 But it
55 The plaintiffs in Sony tried to offer evidence at trial that the VCR could have been de-
signed to allow recording only if the broadcaster indicated that recording was permitted, at a
cost of under $15 per VCR. LARDNER, supra note 51, at 104-05. See also 464 U.S. at 815
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Sony may be able, for example, to build a VTR that enables broad-
casters to scramble the signal of individual programs and 'jam' the unauthorized recording of
them.").
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also depends in part on whether the activity is infringing, and to what
extent, since the proposed secondary liability analysis focuses on act-
ing reasonably to prevent infringement. The question of whether
home time-shifting infringes, however, was not firmly resolved until
the Supreme Court's Sony decision in 1984, nearly eight years after
the copyright owners filed suit, and many years after Sony's original
VCRs were designed. And while the Sony majority held home time-
shifting to be fair use, a majority of all 13 federal judges who consid-
ered the question ruled time-shifting to be infringing use.56
This points to the dilemma facing a technology developer trying to
avoid secondary liability under the proposed test: the technology may
enable some activity that might be infringing, but the developer will
have to consider whether to design the technology to limit or elimi-
nate that activity without knowing for certain whether it is infringing.(Indeed, the dilemma may be more acute, as the activity may clearly
be noninfringing in some circumstances-for example, home time-
shifting authorized by copyright owners or of noncopyrighted con-
tent-as well as potentially infringing in others.) If the activity is
ultimately held not to infringe, then the developer presumably faces
no liability for supplying the technology that enables the activity. But
if the activity is ultimately ruled to infringe, and the developer could
reasonably have designed the technology in a way that would have
limited the activity, the designer would seem to be liable for infring-
ing use under the proposed analysis. Given the initial uncertainty of
whether the activity infringed, a court might refuse to impose mone-
tary liability on the designer for activity that occurred before its in-
fringing nature was clear; I have elsewhere suggested a somewhat
similar approach to issues of direct liability where the legality of the
use is uncertain. But once a court rules that the technology's use is
infringing, a court would presumably enjoin the continuing supply of
the technology, and the supplier would be unable to recover any more
of its investment in the development of the technology.
As a result, if the technology supplier's liability turns on whether it
reasonably designed the technology to reduce infringement, rational
developers may be inclined to design their technology to limit activi-
ties that might infringe, but that might instead turn out to be found
56 Three circuit judges and four Supreme Court justices would have ruled that unauthor-
ized home time-shifting was not fair use. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,
457 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). One district judge and five Supreme Court justices ruled
that it was fair use. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D.
Cal. 1979); Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
57 R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Copyright Infringement at 63-74 (2005) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
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noninfringing. This caution might deny to the public technologies
that enable legitimate, noninfringing uses.58
C. Sony as a Better Alternative
The proposed reasonable design standard for secondary liability
will often require courts and technology developers to weigh a dual-
use technology's costs and benefits in the technology's very early
days. This Part has argued that there are good reasons to expect that
this early-stage evaluation may generally understate the net social
benefit of the new technology, leading technology developers not to
produce the technology or leading courts to impose liability on them
for doing so. Given the difficulties of accurately applying the reason-
able design standard to relatively new technologies, I fear that this
standard will restrict the availability of technologies that, in the long
run, would prove to create social benefits greater than the costs of the
infringement that they enable. Courts may have to engage in this kind
of analysis, despite its problems, when the new technology at issue
causes physical injury or damage, as in the products liability and neg-
ligence cases on which Professor Yen draws. But it is not clear that
the potential economic injury of copyright infringement necessitates
this kind of analysis, given the inherent problems of evaluating new
technologies in their early stages.
By contrast, the Sony rule that a technology supplier is not liable as
long as its technology is capable of substantial noninfringing use
poses much less danger that courts will outlaw technologies that on
the whole benefit society. Properly read, the Sony test's focus on a
technology's capacity for substantial noninfringing use means that the
vast majority of dual-use technologies will easily qualify for protec-
tion against secondary liability claims: by definition, these technolo-
gies have noninfringing uses, and in most cases those uses could be or
become substantial. In a sense, the Sony standard balances the costs
and benefits involved in the deployment of new dual-use technologies
not at the level of each particular technology, but at a more general
level, and represents a conclusion that on balance the social benefits
of dual-use technologies are sufficiently likely to exceed their costs in
most cases to justify a general rule against secondary liability as long
as the technology is in fact capable of substantial noninfringing use.
The fact that most technologies will pass muster under Sony
means, of course, that in particular cases, supplying a technology will
58 Indeed, the question of whether the technology's use is infringing may never be re-
solved. If Sony (or a competitor) had not marketed a VCR that enabled home time-shifting, the
courts would not have had occasion to consider its copyright implications.
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be held lawful because it could potentially have a net social benefit,
when in fact it has a net social cost. This is essentially the inverse of
the danger that the reasonable design test will suppress too many
technologies: the Sony test may suppress too few. While the view
underlying Sony is that dual-use technologies will generally provide a
net social benefit, in individual cases any particular technology's
costs might outweigh its benefits, and p2p networks might be a case
where they do so.
There are, however, reasons to prefer Sony's possible tolerance of
too many dual-use technologies that have a net harm over the reason-
able design standard's possible intolerance of technologies with a net
social benefit. First, while the harms caused by infringing uses of a
dual-use technology are enabled by the technology supplier, they are
directly caused by the technology user who engages in acts of copy-
right infringement. This means that in a dual-use technology case,
there will always be a party more directly culpable for the harm than
the technology supplier and against whom an injured copyright owner
can seek redress. With widely disseminated technologies, seeking to
hold direct infringers liable can be very costly, though music copy-
right owners have begun to take this approach by suing infringing
users of p2p systems, and Mark Lemley and I have proposed an ad-
ministrative system that would reduce the costs of pursuing direct
infringement claims.59
Second, and more importantly, the Sony standard for secondary li-
ability offers copyright owners and society only a first line of defense
against technologies that impose a net harm, and it is an appropriately
restrained protection given the likely uncertainty in many cases about
the costs and benefits of the dual-use technology. But the fact that a
technology passes the Sony test need not finally resolve the question
of that technology's permissibility. In any particular case in which
the net harm of the technology can be established with more certainty,
Congress can amend copyright law to address that particular technol-
ogy. Congress, of course, has potentially better mechanisms than
courts to gather more certain information about the harms and bene-
fits of a challenged technology. In addition, Congress has a more
robust range of remedies available, some of which may allow more of
a technology's noninfringing use than the simple imposition of sec-
ondary liability on the technology's supplier, particularly within a
copyright system that offers often supracompensatory remedies (in
the form of statutory damages) and routine injunctive relief.
59 Lemley & Reese, supra note 8, at 1410-25.
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Congress essentially took this approach to digital audio recording
technology when it adopted the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
and imposed a levy and technological protection system on digital
audio recording devices and media in return for an exemption from
liability for those who supply or use those devices. 60 And as noted
above, several proposals have been made for legislation that would
specifically address infringement over p2p networks.61 Such legisla-
tive solutions to the harms of dual-use technologies have the advan-
tage that, in contrast to a revised secondary liability standard, they can
be targeted at a particular technology of concern rather than applying
to all dual-use technologies generally.
Finally, suppressing too many dual-use technologies in the digital
environment may do more harm to the production of transformative
works of expression than it would have with respect to earlier dual-
use technologies such as the VCR or the photocopier. In the past,
many noninfringing uses of a new technology were, in the language
of the Sony opinions, "consumptive. 62 They generally allowed in-
creased access to a copyrighted work as it was produced and dissemi-
nated by the copyright owner. For example, a VCR allowed a user to
record the evening news in order to watch it at a more convenient
time. Indeed, one of the main disagreements between the Supreme
Court majority and dissenters, and between the Ninth Circuit panel
and the district court, was whether such "consumptive" uses could
qualify as fair uses. But those on both sides of the question recog-
nized that such uses generally involve the passive receipt of copy-
righted works.
Digital technologies today, however, enable (or promise to enable)
uses that are far more "productive" and that result in the creation of
new, expressive works of authorship, as Larry Lessig, Neil Netanel,
and Joe Liu, among others, have recognized. 63 Someone who digi-
tally records the evening news may still be doing so to watch it at a
more convenient time. But she may instead be recording it in order to
use some of the footage of an event reported in the news to produce
60 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, § 2, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified
as 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10).
61 See supra, text accompanying notes 25-27.
62 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.33, 455 n.40
(1984); id. at 475-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Amer-
ica, 659 F.2d 963, 970-72 (9th Cir. 1981).
63 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's
Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003). Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Non-
commercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2003).
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her own commentary. For example, as a commentary on Anglo-
American cooperation in launching and prosecuting the war in Iraq,
she might record footage of public appearances by George Bush and
Tony Blair, together and separately, in order to produce a video in
which that footage is synchronized to the Diana Ross and Lionel
Ritchie duet "Endless Love," so that the political leaders appear to be
singing the lyrics to each other. 64 The relative ease with which digital
technology allows such expressive re-use of works of authorship, as
compared with older analog technologies, means that shortsighted-
ness about potential noninfringing uses of new technologies will have
greater negative effects today than in the past, when declaring a de-
vice contraband would have cut off more consumptive than produc-
tive uses.
CONCLUSION
Professor Yen's proposal to revisit the tort principles that under-
gird copyright's secondary liability doctrines has great appeal in the
many novel cases being brought at the boundaries of traditional sec-
ondary liability. And evaluating the liability of a supplier of a dual-
use technology by a standard other than copyright's traditional doc-
trinal tests for secondary liability is equally appealing. But the pro-
posal to judge dual-use technologies based on whether they were rea-
sonably designed to limit infringement will likely lead courts to im-
pose liability on technologies that produce a net benefit to society and
to deter developers from creating such technologies. This is in large
part because information about the technology's benefits is likely to
be poor in the early stages of its evolution, when developers and
courts will often have to evaluate the reasonableness of the design.
By contrast, Sony's substantial noninfringing use test for liability is
generally less likely to suppress beneficial technologies, while leaving
open many avenues to reduce the harm of dual-use technologies in
particular instances when good information exists that the harms out-
weigh the benefits.
64 See http://politicalhumor.about.com/cs/bushmultimedia/v/blendlesslove.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 5, 2005). The actual video was apparently produced for a Swedish television program.
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